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1. Introduction !
In her recent Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association, “Good-
For-Nothings”, Susan Wolf  (2011) argues against welfarism about value by appeal to 
great works of  art, literature, music, and philosophy. According to welfarism, some-
thing is good just in case it is good for some being or beings.  Wolf  provides three main 1
arguments against this view, which I will call The Superfluity Argument, The Expla-
nation of  Benefit Argument, and The Welfarist’s Mistake. In this paper, I will recon-
struct these arguments and explain where, in my view, each goes wrong. 
  
2. The Superfluity Argument !
The Superfluity Argument begins with a distinction between two senses in which 
something may benefit a person: the Ordinary Sense and the Robust Sense. Something 
benefits a person in the Robust Sense just in case it results in his ending up with a 
higher net level of  lifetime welfare than he would have ended up with if  this thing had 
not been the case. Something benefits a person in the Ordinary Sense just in case it 
benefits him, but not in the Robust Sense. To illustrate the difference, Wolf  gives the 
example of  a man who rescues a drowning child even though another person would 
have done so if  he had not. The actual rescuer benefits the child in the Ordinary 
Sense (for he was the one was saved her), but due to the presence of  this other person, 
he does not benefit her in the Robust Sense. 
A welfarist, Wolf  claims, must hold that it is only by benefiting beings in the Ro-
bust Sense that things get to count as good. However, most great works, she argues, if  
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 Note that the good in question is not the moral good, but the good simpliciter.1
they Robustly benefit anyone, Robustly benefit only their creators, by “giving them 
something to do and possibly advancing their careers” (2011, 48). The vast majority 
of  great works, considered individually, Robustly benefit nobody else. This is because 
there !
is more great art, literature, music, and so on around than I, or anyone, has time 
to appreciate in a lifetime. If  the excellent novel or film you actually enjoyed had 
not been available, or the painting you contemplated on your last trip to an art 
museum had been on loan to another gallery, there would have been another just 
as good and worthwhile that you could have read, watched, or pored over 
instead...If  it were not one Rembrandt self-portrait, it would have been another. 
If  not the Palliser novels, then Barchester Towers (2011, 48). !
This is a problem for welfarism, Wolf  thinks, because it is intuitively obvious that these 
great works have value over and above any they derive from benefiting their creators. It is 
good that Trollope wrote Barchester Towers not only because this benefited Trollope. Simi-
larly, it would have been “a great shame” if  the Dutch painter “[Gerrit] Dou had be-
come a chemist instead of  a painter [and so his] works never been created” (2011, 49), 
and not only because this may have been bad for Dou. 
What further value does a great work of  art have? Wolf ’s answer (by her own ad-
mission, underdeveloped) is !
its beauty, broadly conceived, or, to use an even vaguer term, its aesthetic excellence. 
And at least part of  what is good about philosophy, history, and science is similarly 
noninstrumental (2011, 52). !
How should a welfarist respond? He should begin, I believe, by disputing Wolf ’s claim 
that great works Robustly benefit only their creators. Almost every great work, it seems 
plausible to think, finds what we might call ‘a special connection’ with some individuals. 
That is, for almost any great work there will invariably be some people who are so tak-
en with it that it contributes more to their lifetime welfare than would have been con-
tributed by the works these people would have “read, watched, or pored over instead” 
had the work in question not been produced. 
I, for example, especially love the music of  Joanna Newsom. If  Newsom had nev-
er picked up a harp, then the time when I first heard her music on the radio would 
have been a time when I heard the music of  some other musician instead. It is incred-
ibly unlikely that this other person’s music would have appealed to me to anywhere 
near the same degree as Newsom’s. Therefore, other things being equal, there will end 
up having been more joy in my life as a result of  Newsom’s having written and 
recorded her songs.  
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Moreover, as a result of  hearing Newsom’s music, I have been more powerfully 
motivated to discover and listen to other artists in the indie/folk genre—not to men-
tion recommend their music to others. Consequently, there will be more good music in 
my life, and in the lives of  my friend, as a result of  my having heard Newsom.  
While not everyone finds this sort of  connection with the music of  Joanna New-
som (to say the least!), almost everyone finds a connection of  this kind with some great 
artist’s work. There are few great works that do not in this way appeal to and inspire 
some people. 
The second thing a welfarist should do in responding to Wolf ’s first argument is 
dispute her claim that a welfarist must hold that it is only by benefiting people in the 
Robust Sense that things get to count as good. It is enough on welfarism properly con-
ceived for something to count as good that it make someone better off  in some way in 
his life considered as a whole—i.e., positively affect in some way the make-up or constitu-
tion of  his lifetime welfare. A net positive contribution to lifetime welfare is simply not 
required. 
Your reading Barchester Towers, for example, rather than some other great work—
say, George Eliot’s Middlemarch—even if  this does not result in your ending up with a 
higher net level of  lifetime welfare, will nonetheless make you better off  in one way in 
your life considered as a whole. This is because the contribution made to one’s lifetime 
welfare by reading the former work is not just the same kind as that provided by one’s 
reading the latter (assuming one understands the works in question). It is not as if  
reading these works contributes to one’s lifetime welfare by adding to a tally of  ‘great 
novels read’. Instead, the benefits conferred are qualitatively different, involving, for 
example, different kinds of  pleasurable experiences, different insights, and so on. 
(More on this shortly.) If  you will never read Barchester Towers, then you will miss out on 
a particular kind or quality of  benefit that is obtainable only by reading Barchester Tow-
ers. It is for this reason that a welfarist can say that there is value in your reading Barch-
ester Towers even if  it doesn’t confer a net lifetime benefit upon you. !
3. The Explanation of  Benefit Argument !
As I have said, Wolf  believes that most great works Robustly benefit only their cre-
ators. She accepts, however, that they benefit many people in the Ordinary Sense. In-
deed, she argues, this latter benefit is so great that it cannot be accounted for in purely 
“naturalistic” (2011, 54) terms, by reference to things such as the pleasures these works 
provide. Plenty of  people, she claims, get as much (or even more) pleasure from expe-
riencing works that are, intuitively, nowhere near as good for them as contact with a 
great work would be. Many people, for example, !
seem to like [the Da Vinci Code] more [than Middlemarch]—to read it more avidly, 
to recommend it more to friends. They get more enjoyment, in other words, out 
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of  reading Dan Brown than George Eliot (2011, 54). 
	  
Many of  these people, however, Wolf  thinks, would be better off  reading the Eliot. 
If  we are going to account for how good for us great works are, Wolf  maintains, 
we need to hold that they have value independently of  their being good for anybody, 
and then say that !
it is a kind of  good fortune to be able to interact with these [works], in a way that 
involves going some way toward understanding and appreciating [this indepen-
dent] value (2011, 55). !
Why is it better for us to read Middlemarch than the Da Vinci Code even if  we would en-
joy the latter more? It is because in reading the former we would be coming into con-
tact, in a pleasurable or appreciative way, with one of  “the works of  supreme human 
accomplishment”, whose primary value is prior to, and not dependent on, its tendency 
to benefit anyone (2011, 55). 
How should a welfarist respond? One strategy would be to argue that, while it is 
true that we cannot account for the value for us of  great works purely by reference to 
the pleasures they provide, we can do so by reference to certain other naturalistic features 
of  these works or of  the world. Suppose, for example, that the right theory of  welfare 
is an idealised desire-based one, on which welfare consists in getting what one would want 
if  one were suitably idealised (say, fully informed and vividly imagining all relevant 
facts). In this case, a welfarist could say that the reason many of  us would be better off  
reading Middlemarch than the Da Vinci Code, even if  we would enjoy the latter more, is 
that suitably idealised we would prefer to have the former work in our lives. As evi-
dence for this hypothesis about people’s idealised preferences, a welfarist might claim 
that many well-educated people with wide experience of  the world seem to prefer to 
have great, rather than lesser, works in their lives. 
But this proposal his little to recommend it. Quite apart from its controversial 
claim about what most well-educated people would prefer, it is implausible that great 
works are so good for us because we (would) want to read (or to have read) them. Our 
wanting to read (or to have read) Middlemarch does not seem to be what makes our read-
ing this novel so very good for us. On the contrary, it seems to be that when we want 
to read (or to have read) such works this is because we have come to see how good it is 
for us to read them, or at the very least because we are in some way responding to 
whatever feature it is in virtue of  which they are so very good for us. 
A different possibility is that some perfectionist theory of  welfare is true, on which 
what is intrinsically good for a given creature is just to exercise or realise whatever ca-
pacities are definitive of  that creature’s nature. A welfarist could then say that great 
works have value for human beings over and above any pleasure they offer us because 
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they enable us to exercise or realise our capacities for intelligent thought, sympathetic 
identification, or imagination. 
But there are many well-known and, frankly, devastating problems with perfec-
tionism. First, there is the problem of  how to identify the nature of  a given creature. 
Why should human nature, for example, be identified with capacities for intelligence, 
sympathy, and imagination, rather than, say, capacities for cruelty, avarice, idolatry, 
and so on? Second, and more problematic still, it is tempting to think that it can be 
bad for creatures that they have the particular natures they do. Cows, for example, cannot 
appreciate great art, literature, music, and so on. This seems bad for cows. By con-
trast, it is our good fortune to have a nature that allows us to create and enjoy such 
works.  2
What, then, is the right response for a welfarist to make? It is, I believe, to return 
to pleasure. We can account for the value for us of  great works just in terms of  the 
pleasures they provide.  Not only are some of  these pleasures more pleasurable than 3
any offered by lesser works, many of  them (unlike the pleasures of  lesser works) are 
qualitatively unique, which greatly increases their contribution to lifetime welfare. 
Let us start with the question of  quantity. Wolf  endorses a desire-based theory of  
pleasure when she says that lesser works are more pleasurable because they are more 
avidly read and recommended to friends. On desire-based theories of  pleasure, it is 
our desires to be having, or to continue having, particular experiences that make them 
count as pleasurable. But desire-based theories face major problems. Wanting an ex-
perience because, say, one finds it interesting, or because one’s friends have told one 
that one would find it pleasurable, or because one has been exposed to advertisements 
recommending it, does not entail that this experience would be pleasurable for one. 
This worry, admittedly, can be overcome by stipulating that it is only an intrinsic 
desire of  one’s that a particular experience of  one’s be occurring that makes it count 
as pleasurable.  But this more sophisticated desire-based theory faces problems of  its 4
own. It cannot, for example, account for pleasures whose subject has no awareness of  
them (even on an unconscious level) at the time of  experience.  One cannot have an 5
intrinsic desire that a particular experience be occurring if  one has no awareness 
whatever that it is occurring. Furthermore, all desire-based theories of  pleasure (like 
their cousins, desire-based theories of  welfare) seem to get the order of  explanation 
the wrong way around. When we like or want, say, a particular experience of  orgasm, 
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 Note, however, that depending on how we are to understand the ‘nature’ of  a particular be2 -
ing, there may be some aspects of  a being’s nature that this being could not be without. Such as-
pects of  a being’s nature could not count as good or bad for this being (unless, of  course, they 
were to affect its ability to fulfill other aspects of  its nature).
 Note that I do not wish to be committed here to hedonism about welfare. My point is more 3
narrow: that hedonism can account for the value for us of  great works.
 See Heathwood (2007).4
 See Bramble (2013).5
it seems not to be our liking or wanting it that makes it pleasurable. Rather, we like or 
want it because it is so very pleasurable. What, after all, in the case of  orgasm, is the 
affectively neutral experience supposed to be that we take up our pro-attitude to? And 
why would we like or want it? 
What, then, is the correct theory of  pleasure? It is, I believe, a felt-quality one. On 
felt-quality theories, pleasures (along with degrees of  pleasurableness) are determined 
just by the phenomenology of  the experiences in question (i.e., ‘what it’s like’ to be 
having them). A welfarist should adopt a felt-quality theory of  pleasure, and then say 
that there is phenomenology that is available from great works like Middlemarch and 
Barchester Towers that is more pleasurable than any that is available from lesser works 
like the Da Vinci Code. The idea, of  course, is not that every individual’s experience of  
reading Middlemarch is going to contain or give rise to this phenomenology. Some peo-
ple’s experience of  reading Middlemarch is not pleasurable at all. The idea is rather that 
for those who understand and appreciate a great work like Middlemarch there are more plea-
surable pleasures available from it than there are for those who fully understand and 
appreciate a lesser work, like the Da Vinci Code. 
What pleasures am I talking about? Consider three of  the main sorts of  pleasures 
provided by reading novels: !
1. The pleasures of  being mentally transported—i.e., of  being drawn out of  one’s or-
dinary surroundings or everyday life and immersed in a strange or unfamiliar 
world that may be beautiful or interesting in various ways. !
2. The pleasures of  getting to know the main characters of  the novel—i.e., of  coming to 
see the world from their perspective, whether it is a familiar or an alien one. !
3. The pleasures of  being provoked to think—just as there are the pleasures of  exer-
cising one’s body, there are the pleasures of  exercising one’s mind, of  seeing 
things in new or different ways, or with deeper levels of  understanding. !
It is virtually a platitude that great novels are far more effective at transporting or im-
mersing one, portraying realistic or interesting characters, and provoking thought or 
deepening one’s understanding of  the world. It therefore seems reasonable to think 
that they are better also at delivering the associated pleasures. 
Let me consider several objections to this argument. The first is that even if  it 
were true that great works are better at providing these three sorts of  pleasures, many 
lesser works offer other sorts of  pleasures that are no less intense, and that may on cer-
tain occasions be even more intense. Consider, for example, the pleasures of  excite-
ment, suspense, steamy romance, or witnessing good triumph over evil. 
But it is crucial not to confuse the pleasurableness of  a pleasure (i.e., the degree to 
which it is pleasurable) with its intensity in other senses, for example its introspectability, 
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or its tendency to issue in obvious bodily manifestations. Reading Matthew Reilly’s Ice Station, 
for example, may be a gripping experience, in some ways like a rollercoaster ride. One 
may periodically shiver, gasp, or feel goosebumps, sigh with exhilaration, break into a 
smile, have quickened breathing or sweaty palms. One may be able to focus very clear-
ly via introspection on the particular pleasures it gives one while one is reading it or 
even keep them in mind immediately after putting it down. None of  this entails, how-
ever, that these pleasures are intense in the sense of  being highly pleasurable. Some of  
the most pleasurable pleasures are extremely hard to direct one’s attention to. In a re-
cent paper, Daniel Haybron asks us to consider pleasurable moods, which !
[unlike] sensory affects (viz., physical pleasures and pains)...have no particular lo-
cation or object. (If  they have an object at all, it is everything, which phenomeno-
logically is pretty much like having no object.) They are also highly diffuse, per-
vading the whole of  one’s consciousness. They are, moreover, comparatively di-
aphanous, offering us not so much distinct objects within the field of  conscious-
ness as alterations of  the field itself, coloring the entirety of  our experience (2007, 
398). !
Nonetheless, Haybron rightly points out, such moods are !
quite central to the experienced quality of  our lives...A vague sense of  malaise 
might easily go unnoticed, yet it can sour one’s experience far more than the 
sharper and more pronounced ache that persists after having stubbed one’s 
toe...Presumably being tense, anxious, or stressed detracts substantially from the 
quality of  one’s experience, even when one is unaware of  these states (2007, 398). !
Consider also the following, highly illustrative example of  one of  Oliver Sacks’ pa-
tients, who had lost his sense of  smell. This patient remarked: !
Sense of  smell? I never gave it a thought. You don’t normally give it a thought. 
But when I lost it—it was like being struck blind. Life lost a good deal of  its 
savour—one doesn’t realise how much ‘savour’ is smell. You smell people, you 
smell books, you smell the city, you smell the spring—maybe not consciously, but 
as a rich unconscious background to everything else. My whole world was sud-
denly radically poorer.  6!
Some of  the most pleasurable pleasures are noticeable only if  and when they come to 
an abrupt end. There may even be certain pleasures that it is logically impossible to at-
tend to when they are occurring. Consider the pleasurable experiences of  ‘flow’ or ut-
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 Sacks, quoted in Rachels (2004).6
ter absorption in some activity (say, playing tennis, making love, or meditating). As 
soon as one begins to turn one’s attention toward them, they change or vanish, scatter-
ing like beetles under the refrigerator when the kitchen lights are switched on. 
Returning now to the pleasures offered by great works, many of  these are precise-
ly immersive or ‘flow’ pleasures. While they may be considerably harder to introspect 
or imaginatively pinpoint in oneself, or to discern in the faces or bodily reactions of  
others just by looking, than the pleasures offered by thrillers like the Da Vinci Code or 
Ice Station, they may be considerably more pleasurable nonetheless. Indeed, the fact 
that they are immersive or flow pleasures is some reason to think that there is quite a 
bit more to them than we can easily introspect, that what we can introspect of  them is 
merely the phenomenological tip of  the iceberg, so to speak. 
The second objection I want to consider is that some great works are not pleasur-
able at all. Consider, for example, Ingmar Bergman’s Scenes From A Marriage. Of  its 
third episode, “Paula”, in which a husband returns home only to tell his wife that he 
has fallen in love with another woman and is leaving that night for a long journey, one 
philosopher, Aaron Smuts, writes: 
	  
I would not describe my experience of  this episode as in any way pleasurable, but 
I find it to be one of  the most effective affair fictions ever created. Indeed, pardon 
my gushing, it contains some of  the most powerful moments in cinematic history. 
I would recommend it to others, largely for the experience. But it is not pleasur-
able. No, it is nothing less than emotionally devastating (2011, 247). !
But like the previous objection, this one relies on an overly narrow conception of  plea-
sure or enjoyment. There is, it goes without saying, a kind of  enjoyment that is neces-
sarily light. This is the sort of  enjoyment that finds its natural expression in smiles or 
laughter. It is the sort that we normally associate with having fun. Of  course, no-one 
finds watching Scenes From A Marriage fun, and so enjoyable in this sense. But it is very 
implausible to think that all pleasure must be enjoyment of  this particular kind.  
Sitting in the dark of  the cinema by oneself  watching “Paula” unfold, one is car-
ried away for a brief  while from one’s own life and everyday concerns, and is utterly 
immersed in a world of  tremendous interest and beauty. The characters are flawed 
and unhappy, their lives fraught and complex, but this is partly why the film is so en-
grossing. While watching it, one has many thoughts about life and the world we all 
share (thoughts that are not necessarily conscious)—both insights concerning and im-
proved understanding of  the world. All of  this is deeply pleasurable, though not fun. 
Moreover—and this point is crucial—tragedies like “Paula” offer the viewer sig-
nificant pleasures of  catharsis. Just as there are pleasures of  exercising one’s cognitive 
powers, there seem to be pleasures of  exercising one’s emotional capacities. Just feeling 
deeply, whether the emotion in question is itself  a pleasurable or a painful one, can be 
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exhilarating, and so in this way a source of  pleasure. At such times, and in a familiar 
way of  putting it, one may ‘feel alive again’. One is rejuvenated. 
Furthermore, these emotional reactions can be incredibly therapeutic. Part of  what 
is so tremendously affecting about a tragedy like “Paula” is its tendency to call to mind 
(once again, in most cases unconsciously) similar difficulties, sadness, or even tragedy 
in one’s own life or in the lives of  people one knows. When reminded of  these things, 
the painful emotions associated with them—emotions that one may have repressed or 
ignored—come bubbling again to the surface, where they can be dealt with or flushed 
out of  one’s psyche. By vividly showing that we are not alone in facing such troubles, 
tragedies like Paula can help us to feel better about things.  7
So, while Smuts is right that these works are emotionally devastating—they can be 
extraordinarily sad or painful to watch—our experiences of  them are mixed. There is 
great pleasure here, too. One simplifies the experience if  one ignores these pleasures. 
The third objection I want to consider is that, even if  the argument I have provid-
ed is successful, it succeeds only for films and novels in particular, and not for any oth-
er kinds of  artworks. 
Great paintings, too, however, are often pleasurable by transporting their audi-
ences to the places they depict, or by depicting people whose perspective one is invited 
to consider or share. Similarly, great pieces of  music often work precisely by carrying 
us out of  our ordinary day lives to places that are either described or alluded to in the 
lyrics or (when there are no lyrics) suggested to us by the emotions that the music 
causes us to feel. And, of  course, great paintings and music are often highly thought-
provoking, and so capable of  delivering the pleasures of  thought. 
Some great works, I am willing to concede, do not make available highly pleasur-
able pleasures (either immediately or later on). They may only make us think, or may 
even assault our senses in a purely unpleasurable way. Such works, however, I believe, 
are not among those that are intuitively so very good for us to come into contact with. 
My claim is just that of  those great works contact with which seems especially good for us, all 
have intense pleasures to offer. 
Let us move on, then, to the second thing I believe a welfarist should say in re-
sponse to Wolf ’s second argument. This consists of  two claims: !
1. Many of  the pleasures offered by great works (unlike those made available by 
lesser works) are qualitatively unique. !
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 Moreover, these works might help us to develop or grow as people in ways that might im7 -
prove our ability to experience pleasures (or avoid pains) further down the track. For example, 
one’s watching Scenes From a Marriage might make one a more sympathetic person, and so bet-
ter able to experience the pleasures of  love later in one’s life. Alternatively, one may learn 
things from watching it that could help one to save one’s own marriage (or perhaps to realise 
that one should not get married in the first place!).
2. Qualitatively unique pleasures add considerably more to a person’s lifetime 
welfare. !
Consider (1). It is a platitude that the characters, plots, themes, etc., of  lesser works are 
none too original—they are, in their most essential features, just the same as or very 
similar to what one finds in many other works, with only minor superficial differences. 
Same product, different packaging, as one might put it. By contrast, all great works are 
original in various ways. If  they are especially immersive, then they may take one to 
places that no other work does. If  their characters are highly realistic, then they will 
be, like real people, unique. If  they are highly thought-provoking, then it is likely that 
they are giving us thoughts, or a perspective on the world, that no other work conveys. 
These differences between lesser and great works naturally have implications for 
the qualitative character of  the pleasures they provide us with—these pleasures, after 
all, are bound up with the places these works take one to, the characters they portray, 
and the ideas they explore. This makes such works very different from lesser ones, 
which are merely different vehicles for what are essentially the same set of  pleasures. 
Now, consider (2). It is common these days for philosophers to hold that lifetime 
welfare is not equivalent simply to the sum of  momentary welfare throughout one’s life. 
David Velleman (1991), for example, says that some momentary misfortunes may not 
detract from lifetime welfare at all if  they are suitably redeemed by later events (whether 
they are so redeemed, on Velleman’s view, depends on their place in what Velleman 
calls the story of  one’s life). Others, like Michael Slote (1983), hold that the timing of  
an event makes an intrinsic difference to its contribution to lifetime welfare (events 
happening during one’s biological prime, Slote believes, contribute more). 
My claim belongs in the same family as these claims. On the view I am proposing, 
pleasures that bring nothing new to the table qualitatively speaking—purely repeated 
pleasures, as we might call them—count for little or perhaps even nothing toward a per-
son’s lifetime welfare. By contrast, pleasures that add something new to the palate of  
pleasures felt throughout one’s life contribute considerably more. 
If  this were so, then it would explain what is deficient in a number of  famously 
wasted lives. Consider: !
1. Roger Crisp’s Oyster, whose life consists “only of  mild sensual pleasure, rather 
like that experienced by humans when floating very drunk in a warm 
bath” (2006, 630). !
2. Susan Wolf ’s Blob, who “spends day after day, or night after night, in front of  a 
television set, drinking beer and watching situation comedies” (2007, 65). !
3. David Wiggins’ Hog Farmer, who “grows more corn to feed more hogs to buy 
more land to grow more corn to feed more hogs” (1976, 100). 
!10
!
These lives are utterly unenviable. Their subjects have little or no self-interested reason 
to go on living. Extra days, weeks, months, would add little or nothing to their lifetime 
welfare. Why is this so? I believe it is because, while these individuals continue to have 
pleasures (pleasures they may never tire of !), these pleasures are just more of  the same. 
There is nothing qualitatively new in any of  them.  8
Still, some readers may find it hard to accept that purely repeated pleasures add 
little or nothing in and of  themselves to lifetime welfare. For example, it may be sug-
gested: “I love oatmeal for breakfast and I have it every morning. I never tire of  it. Are 
you telling me that it would be better for me to have a breakfast that I would enjoy 
less?” Or: “I re-read Middlemarch every three years and I never get bored with it. I 
love those characters. Are you telling me that I should read works that give me less en-
joyment and that I consider inferior?” 
It is important to realise, however, that purely repeated pleasures, while they add 
little or nothing in and of  themselves to lifetime welfare, may still have considerable in-
strumental value for one. The pleasures of  porridge may be essential in order for one to 
get off  on the right foot each morning. Without them, or other similar pleasures, one 
might have great difficulty being productive or taking joy in various other things. Simi-
larly, if  one has read Middlemarch so many times that there is truly nothing new in 
terms of  pleasure for one to get from reading it another time, then the pleasures of  re-
reading it every few years may add nothing in and of  themselves to one’s lifetime wel-
fare. But re-reading it might still be very good for one—if, for example, one finds this a 
rejuvenating, relaxing, or stimulating activity—all of  which may help one to better 
function in one’s life and so reach pleasures that are qualitatively new (or perhaps, de-
pending on the right theory of  welfare, other things besides pleasures that are intrinsi-
cally good for one). 
I conclude that by distinguishing the pleasurableness of  a pleasure from its inten-
sity in other senses, and emphasising the importance of  qualitative diversity in one’s 
pleasures, a welfarist can account for the value for us of  great works simply by appeal 
to the pleasures these works can provide those who understand and appreciate them. !
4. The Welfarist’s Mistake !
Wolf ’s third argument is a diagnosis of  the welfarist’s mistake. According to Wolf, 
many philosophers who are attracted to welfarism start with a plausible claim like one 
of  the following:  
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 An anonymous reviewer suggests to me that these lives seem wasted not because they involve 8
no qualitatively new pleasures, but because the pleasures they do involve are merely sensual or 
bodily ones. But it seems to me that a life spent having the same higher pleasure over and over 
again (say, of  re-reading Middlemarch well beyond the point at which there is anything new to 
be gleaned from it) would also be a largely wasted life.
!
(a) “A great painting locked in a vault that will self-destruct if  humans tampered 
with it would not be worth saving” (2011, 56). !
(b) “Contemplating a future in which human life has been destroyed, there [is] 
nothing further to regret when one learns that the Louvre and all its contents 
have been destroyed as well” (2011, 56). !
They then infer from the truth of  such a claim that it is a condition of  the value of  
such works that they benefit people. 
But this is a bad inference, Wolf  says. While (a) and (b) are indeed plausible 
claims, this is not because it is a condition of  the value of  such works that they benefit 
people. Instead, it is merely because it is a condition of  the value of  such works that 
they have a “capacity to give rise to human experiences of  certain sorts” (2011, 59). Why is the 
painting locked in a vault not worth preserving? It is not because, if  it were preserved, 
it would benefit nobody, but instead because it could never lead to certain kinds of  
human experiences.  
But there is a problem with Wolf ’s argument. It is not plausible that the reason 
that the works in (a) and (b) are not worth preserving is that they lack a capacity to give 
rise to certain human experiences. It is more plausible that they are not worth preserv-
ing because they would not give rise to any such experiences. To see that this is so, con-
sider a painting that is not in a vault at all, but rather buried in a place where, as it 
happens, it will never be found. Is this painting worth preserving? Presumably not. 
However, it, unlike the paintings in (a) and (b), clearly has a capacity to lead to human 
experiences of  certain sorts. 
Wolf  might respond that, in her sense of  capacity, the buried painting also lacks 
the capacity to lead to the relevant human experiences. But in that case we might rea-
sonably wonder what sense of  capacity Wolf  has in mind (regrettably, she is not ex-
plicit about this). What would be an example of  a painting that if  preserved would not 
lead to any such experiences, but nonetheless has the capacity to do so? 
Faced with these worries, Wolf  might accept that talk of  a capacity here is mis-
leading, and suggest instead that her point is really that a great work is worth preserv-
ing only if  it would lead to human experiences of  certain sorts. It is this claim, she 
might insist, that explains why the paintings in (a) and (b) are not worth preserving, but 
does not entail welfarism (since leading to certain kinds of  human experiences is not 
the same thing as benefiting anyone). 
The trouble with this response is that if  the reason that the paintings in (a) and (b) 
are not worth preserving is that they would not lead to certain kinds of  human experi-
ences, then it is extremely tempting to think that the paintings are valuable as mere 
means to the relevant experiences. But this conclusion—while it does not entail wel-
farism—is clearly in conflict with Wolf ’s Explanation of  Benefit Argument. This ar-
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gument, remember, says that coming into contact with great works is so very good for 
us because in doing so we are coming into contact with things that are valuable inde-
pendently of  their effects on us. 
Furthermore, it would be exceedingly odd, to say the least, if  these paintings 
were valuable only as means to our having pleasurable experiences of  appreciation, 
but not solely because—by being such means—they were good for us. This is because 
it would be exceedingly odd to think that these pleasurable experiences of  apprecia-
tion, while among the things that are paradigmatically good for us, were not solely 
good by being good for us. 
Finally, Wolf  might suggest that her view is rather that, while the value of  great 
works depends on their actually leading to certain kinds of  human experiences, these 
works are not valuable as mere means to such experiences. Instead, it is just these 
works that are valuable, but it is a condition of  this value that they be eventually expe-
rienced. 
This is, admittedly, a possible view. But it does not seem very appealing. We might 
reasonably ask: Why must these works be experienced if  they are to have value? The 
most natural answer is because of  the value of  these experiences. !
5. Conclusion !
In this paper, I have reconstructed and evaluated Wolf ’s three main arguments against 
welfarism in her great work “Good-For-Nothings”. While none of  these arguments is 
ultimately successful, Wolf ’s work is valuable indeed. Its value lies in its significant con-
tribution to the welfare of  its readers and those whom we will benefit. 
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